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Affirmative Action and Admissions
at a Jesuit Law School
Alan Raphael*
The United States Supreme Court's 2003 decisions I regarding
affirmative action in higher education have prompted observations
about the issues the Court addressed, the importance and effect of
Supreme Court pronouncements, and the effect of admissions decisions
on the achievement of the mission of Jesuit law schools.
I applaud the Court's upholding the use of race as a factor in
admission decisions in order to promote diversity as symbolically
important, but believe that current levels of most affirmative action
programs have been inadequate. Now that the Supreme Court has
upheld the use of race and ethnicity in university admissions, Loyola
University Chicago should greatly increase its commitment to a diverse
student body in order to benefit society and to fulfill the Jesuit
commitment to serving the poor and to striving to create a just society.
THE DECISIONS
The Court's decisions concluded that race may be used as a factor in
determining admission to colleges and professional or graduate schools
to help bring about the educational benefit of an increased diversity in
the student body. However, race may not be the sole factor nor be
given a set value in admissions decisions.2  Rather, it can be one of
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
2. Gratz v. Bollinger involved a challenge to the University of Michigan undergraduate
college admissions program, while Grutter v. Bollinger involved a challenge to the admissions
program of the University of Michigan Law School. Regarding the undergraduate admissions,
the university used numerous factors in making admissions decisions including high school
grades, standardized test scores, high school quality and curriculum, geography, relationships to
alumni and race. During the period under scrutiny, these factors were given numerical scores and
a score of one hundred was required for admission. All African-Americans, Hispanics, and
Native Americans were given twenty points because of being "underrepresented minorities." The
petitioners in Gratz were white students who demonstrated that students from underrepresented
minorities were routinely admitted to the university and had admissions scores which would have
been lower than theirs except for the additional twenty points awarded on the basis of race or
ethnicity. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners had standing to complain of their disparate
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many factors used in admissions decisions. The Court majority elevated
the position taken a generation earlier by Justice Powell in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke to become the Court's standard for
determining whether such use of race is permissible under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.3 In 2003,
the Court examined the admissions programs of the University of
Michigan, which is a state school and therefore governed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, these decisions also govern the
actions of private schools as well as state schools. Private educational
institutions receive substantial amounts of federal money, including
loan guarantees supporting most students' ability to pay tuition and
other costs. The laws regarding these appropriations require that private
universities not engage in prohibited racial discrimination.4 Thus, if the
Court had found unconstitutional any use of race in admissions by the
University of Michigan, it would have effectively invalidated its use by
private institutions.
In sum, the Supreme Court's recent decisions stand for the following
propositions, which have both practical effect and symbolic importance.
First, unequal opportunities persist in this country on a racial basis, but
treatment, that race or ethnicity could be considered as a positive factor in admissions decisions
without violating the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, but that the granting of
twenty points to every member of these groups was not a narrowly tailored mechanism to achieve
increased educational diversity because it caused race or ethnicity to be a determinative factor
rather than merely a permitted plus factor in admissions. The Court invalidated the university's
undergraduate admissions policy, while permitting use of race or ethnicity to be considered in
future admissions decisions, which need to be individualized decisions about each student rather
than giving such great weight to race and ethnicity to effectively guarantee admission to all
minimally qualified students of those races or ethnicity.
Grutter v. Bollinger involved the admissions program of the University of Michigan Law
School. The law school looked at a variety of factors to determine which students to admit,
including undergraduate grades, LSAT scores, personal statements, letters of recommendation,
and "an essay describing the ways in which the applicant will contribute to the life and diversity
of the Law School." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315. Although the diversity sought by the school was
not limited to racial and ethnic diversity, the law school sought to increase the number of
underrepresented minority students and to achieve a "critical mass" of such students to "ensur[e]
their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the Law School." Id. at 316. In
upholding the constitutionality of the law school admissions policies, the Court held that the law
school program did not amount to a quota or a separate admissions track, both impermissible
under Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. Id. at 329. The Court distinguished the
law school admission process as different from the undergraduate program struck down in Gratz,
because the law school did not effectively guarantee admission to all minority group members,
because the admissions decisions were made on an individualized basis using a multi-factor
analysis, because the law school did not limit credit for diversity to only underrepresented racial
groups, and because all of the students admitted were highly qualified. Id. at 336-39.
3. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317-18 (1978).
4. Discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause would also constitute discrimination
prohibited when practiced by recipients of federal funds. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276 n.23.
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they are diminishing. Second, the government or private educational
institutions may help in remedying the inequities by considering race in
educational admissions. Third, education is improved by increased
diversity, including racial diversity, in student bodies. Finally, within a
generation or two, the disparities in opportunity and achievement will
vanish, at which point it will no longer be appropriate or necessary to
consider race in making admissions decisions.
A contrary decision, outlawing race as an admissions factor, would
have had important symbolic meaning. Although its disapproval of
using race as a basis for decision making would be consistent with the
goal of achieving a color blind constitution, it would also have been
interpreted as an abandonment of efforts to eliminate existing racial
disparities in our country.
Recognizing the real and symbolic importance of the cases, in a rare
outpouring of amicus curiae filings, hundreds of organizations signed
briefs in these cases, demonstrating their concern about the issues at
stake. Most parties submitting amicus briefs favored the university's
position. The Supreme Court majority, in Grutter v. Bollinger, cited
with approval several of those amicus briefs, particularly those
representing the positions of major corporations and of the military
establishment. In their briefs, the corporations and military leaders
indicated their support for diverse student bodies to better enable them
to carry out their own operations successfully.
5
The outcomes of the cases were uncertain but not surprising. The
decision upholding as constitutional the law school's admissions
policies was supported by a bare 5-4 majority. The Court reiterated its
holding in Bakke that quotas and separate admissions procedures by
race were unconstitutional.6 It distinguished the law school's policies
designed to produce a "critical mass" of African-American students as a
permissible goal, rather than an impermissible quota. On the other
hand, in the undergraduate case,7 the Court struck down the school's
system of awarding a set number of points to African-Americans and
other minority group members, a mechanism apparently designed to
ensure the admission of a class with desired percentages of those
groups. The law school carefully monitored the admissions process and
continually adjusted the value assigned to race to achieve a critical
mass. Thus, the Court could easily have invalidated as unconstitutional
under Bakke this admissions process as an impermissible quota,
5. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308.
6. Id. at 336; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
7. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 306.
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functionally equivalent to the Michigan undergraduate program which
was struck down.
United States Supreme Court decisions within the previous fifteen
years had narrowed allowable affirmative action in employment and
contracting. 8  In light of these precedents outside the educational
context, significant questions arose about whether the Bakke decision or
Powell's concurrence in that case were correct statements of the law.9
The one-vote margin in the case endorsing Powell's reasoning suggests
the possibility that a change in the composition of the Court in the next
few years might result in a reversal of the decision if the Court were
willing to revisit the issue. , ... ....
Noting that a quarter century had passed since the Bakke decision, the
Court expressed the view that the use of race in university admissions
should not be necessary in another twenty-five years. 1° Perhaps some
of the Justices saw this time limit as merely a hope rather than a
prediction, while others may have seen it as a constitutional requirement
needed in order to meet the narrow tailoring requirement of strict
scrutiny analysis. One or more of the Justices may have insisted upon
this reference as a condition for joining the majority opinion. The
twenty-five year reference has received--deservedly so-much
criticism. It is difficult to understand why a practice could be
constitutional now but would cease to be constitutional in a quarter of a
century, in the absence of an amendment to the Constitution. Similarly,
should the practice become unconstitutional in the future, it likely is
unconstitutional today. The experience of the past quarter century has
shown that the racial disparities in society, although somewhat
narrowed in the interim, have not disappeared. If affirmative action to
overcome barriers to equality is still needed in twenty-five years, it
would seem logical that it would continue to be constitutional.
I have welcomed the increased diversity of student bodies in the last
quarter century, and believe that this diversity has contributed to an
8. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (holding that
"[f]ederal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental
interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest"); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that strict scrutiny should be used in evaluating state and local
affirmative action programs and invalidating a city plan to set aside a certain amount of public
money for minority-owned businesses).
9. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
10. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341-42. The court reasoned that race-conscious admissions policies
must have a time limit to withstand challenge and, noting that twenty-five years have elapsed
since Bakke, indicated that race-based admissions decisions should no longer be needed in
another twenty-five years. Id. The reasoning of the court on this point is unclear and may reflect
disagreements among the justices in the Grutter majority or may be intentionally ambiguous.
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increase of opportunity and a decrease in the grave societal injustices of
inequality and racial discrimination. Achieving those goals should have
been a sufficient justification for the benign use of race in affirmative
action plans. Unfortunately, the Court has long rejected these rationales
and approved of race as an admissions factor only on the theory that
diversity in the student body improves the resulting education.
WOULD A DECISION OUTLAWING USE OF RACE IN ADMISSIONS
HAVE MADE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE?
A decision making race constitutionally impermissible as an
admissions factor would have had a limited practical effect, although its
symbolic importance would have been substantial. A few states have
ended affirmative action in admissions in the last decade, so there is
limited evidence to use in speculating on the effects of the Court having
ruled out race as an admission factor.
California and Washington passed ballot referenda prohibiting
affirmative action in educational admissions, employment, and
contracting.11 Almost a decade before the Supreme Court addressed the
issue, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood 
v. Texas12
declared that Bakke was no longer valid law and prohibited the use of
race in admissions decisions at the Universiy of Texas, a decision
binding in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi.1  In addition, Florida's
governor, Jeb Bush, in 1999 abandoned affirmative action policies in
educational admissions. Thus, evidence from half a dozen states for
several years is available regarding the effect of ending race preferences
in university admissions.
Initially, the numbers of African-American and Hispanic students
entering undergraduate and law schools in those states fell
dramatically. 14  These decreases created political pressure to adopt
ostensibly race-neutral policies intended to increase the number of
minority students, although not necessarily to the degree which had
existed under affirmative action.
11. CAL. CONST. art 1, § 31(a) (enacted by vote on Proposition 209 in November 1996);
Washington State Civil Rights Initiative, WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (adopted in November
1998 and became effective Dec. 3, 1998).
12. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
13. Id. at 934.
14. Rene Sanchez, Black, Hispanic Admissions Plunge at 2 Calif. Campuses, WASH. POST,
Apr. 1, 1998, at A01. At University of California at Berkeley the numbers of African-American
and Hispanic students admitted declined from 1997 to 1998 from 562 and 1045 to 191 and 434.
At UCLA blacks admitted declined forty-three percent, while the number of Hispanics declined
thirty-three percent. Id.
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For instance, Texas instituted a program which guaranteed
undergraduate university admission to any high school graduate in the
state in the top ten percent of his or her class. 15 Because of the high
level of segregation in Texas schools, this measure assured the
admission of many minority students, as well as majority students from
primarily white rural schools, who might otherwise not have been
admitted. This measure, and somewhat similar ones in California and
Florida, 16 did reflect a public perception that it was appropriate to admit
more minority group members to the state schools without explicitly
considering their race in making admissions decisions. These programs
did not, however, result in as high a percentage of minority students
being admitted as had occurred previously under affirmative action. In
California, the number of minority students admitted to the highest
ranked state schools declined significantly, while the numbers of
minority students at lesser ranked state schools did increase
substantially. 17'
These percentage plans only work as long as high schools remain
substantially segregated, a strange basis for a program intended to foster
equality in educational opportunity. In a school almost exclusively
containing African-American or Hispanic students, those in the top ten
percent of the class will almost all be black or Hispanic. If a school
taught a mixture of races and ethnicities, and minority students in
general did not perform as well as other students, the top ten percent of
students might include relatively few minority students, even in a school
whose population was mainly of black and Hispanic students.
Regardless of the successes of such programs, they have little relevance
to law or medical schools, particularly at highly selective state schools
such as those in Michigan and Texas, which attract many students from
out of state. Because the students from whom professional schools
choose their classes are graduates from colleges throughout the country
rather than from high schools in the state, high school graduation rank is
irrelevant. 18
15. Kris Axtman, Affirmative Action, Texas Style, Stirs Criticism, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 12, 2003, at D3.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Our selective four-year colleges and professional programs lack diversity in various ways.
Although this Essay is primarily concerned with racial and ethnic diversity, increasingly those
admitted to better undergraduate, and all professional schools, disproportionately come from
more wealthy backgrounds. Among the causes of this disparity are tuition and cost increases wellin excess of the inflation rate for the past two decades, increases in student debt as the primary
means of financing education, and the greater ability of affluent families to provide experiences
or special instruction to make their children more competitive in the admissions process.
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Even with affirmative action programs, the percentages of minority
group students admitted to law schools have been inadequate. Between
1975 and 1990, African-American law students increased substantially
in both numbers and percentages. Since that time, the percentage has
remained fairly constant at between four to five percent of all law
students, far less than the twelve to thirteen percent African-American
share of the national population. This result, while a clear improvement
over the situation existing a quarter century ago, represents, in my
opinion, an inadequate increase in the number of African-American
attorneys. Now that the Court has allowed law schools to continue to
consider race in making admissions decisions, we need to improve and
expand programs that contribute to breaking down racial barriers in our
profession at a faster rate than has occurred in recent decades.
A DECISION INVALIDATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WOULD HAVE
BEEN WIDELY DISREGARDED
What would have been the effect on admissions programs of
legislative or court actions barring the use of race as a factor in
admissions? I believe that most university admissions programs would
formally have ended all consideration of race if so ordered, and would
try to assure that nothing in their files would show disobedience to the
law. Nevertheless, many admissions committees would continue to try
to achieve the same ends as those previously achieved under affirmative
action programs. Most law schools, for example, claimed before the
decision that they considered numerous factors in deciding whom to
admit and would continue to do so even if race were not allowed to be
one of those factors.
Had the Michigan program been invalidated, admissions mechanisms
would have been changed easily by eliminating race as a factor but
continuing to use a multifactor analysis including non-quantifiable
factors such as recommendation letters and student essays. Many who
are in positions of authority at educational institutions throughout the
country strongly favor, as do I, using measures to increase the numbers
of previously underrepresented students in our colleges and universities.
Their commitment to this goal would have continued even if race was
held not to be a permissible factor in admissions decisions. In
furtherance of this goal of increasing minority enrollment, they would
have sought to use every possible method of doing so short of outright
defiance of the Court decision.
Greater emphasis perhaps would be given to admitting prospective
students engaged in community activities assisting minority youth or
others, or to individuals who have struggled to overcome problems
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associated with poverty or immigration. There could be increased
recruitment at schools with high minority populations, admissions
advantages to those coming from poorer backgrounds or from families
of lower educational achievement, and greater value could be given to
students participating in types of activities more likely to be engaged in
by members of a minority group. This list is only indicative of
approaches which might indirectly favor members of minority groups
applying to educational institutions for admission. In addition, these
emphases would advance the achievement of a Jesuit mission
emphasizing service and a preferential option for the poor.
Both personal experience and the study of constitutional law
convince me that court decisions often fail to change behavior. I have
been at different times a lobbyist at a state legislature and an elected
local government official. In both capacities, I have had various
opportunities to observe officials' reactions to court decisions governing
their actions. There were frequently patterns of technical compliance
and narrow interpretations of court orders so as to allow, if possible, the
continuation of the policies that had been invalidated. My experiences
lead me to assume that officials who favor a policy, particularly if it is
backed by their supervisors or by public opinion among their electorate,
will often persist in implementing that policy despite contrary court
decisions.
Constitutional law developments provide support for my view that
court orders which are unpopular are not necessarily obeyed, exceptperhaps by those directly subject to them whose behavior is subject to
ongoing court oversight. For instance, despite Supreme Court decisions
over thirty years old invalidating government sponsored prayer in
schools, many school districts, particularly in the South and West parts
of the country and in less urban areas continued with obviously illegal
prayer, in part because nobody in the communities opposed the prayers
or was willing to become a litigant to enforce existing precedent.
Similarly, many courts fail to implement decisions regarding the
appointment of counsel for indigent persons in criminal cases. Usually
they are nominally followed, but the funding levels have not been
adjusted to reflect the increase in caseloads or complexity of cases, so
that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel to the indigent
remains an unfulfilled goal. For example, many local governments in
communities with large numbers of minority citizens continue
affirmative action programs in contracting and employment which
would be unlikely to withstand court challenges. Similarly, a court or
legislative action outlawing race as a factor in university admissions
would be disobeyed in many jurisdictions, although there likely would
[Vol. 36
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be technical compliance.
Affirmative action in education continues to be necessary and has had
a clear and positive, but inadequate, effect. If the Supreme Court had
ruled that race could not be used in admissions decisions, many schools
would probably have found ways to assure that the percentage of
African-American and Hispanic students did not decline greatly.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's recent decision may be most
significant not for its consequences in practice, but rather for its
symbolic impact. A decision invalidating the use of race in educational
admissions might have been seen as evidence that our society had
abandoned its decades-long efforts to redress racial discrimination and
inequality. In the past, other Supreme Court decisions have been seen
as having symbolic effects greater than their actual rulings.
For example, the Supreme Court decisions in the late nineteenth
century invalidating civil rights law and upholding segregation have
been viewed as symbolizing a retreat from the post-Civil War efforts at
eliminating the effects of slavery and preventing the creation of unequal
classes of citizens. Brown v. Board of Education19 resulted in almost no
desegregation for fifteen years and de facto educational segregation in
elementary and high schools has been increasing for the past decades,
but the symbolic importance of Brown as a repudiation of American
apartheid is nevertheless substantial.
ADMISSIONS AT JESUIT LAW SCHOOLS
This law journal issue is concerned with "justice" as a pervasive goal
of Jesuit education. Accordingly, I wish to suggest what admissions
policies would best reflect that concern to achieve justice. Jesuit and
Catholic universities and law schools have been engaged in the past
decade in earnest discussions regarding their missions and what, if
anything, makes them distinctive from other educational institutions.
These discussions involve a wide variety of matters such as staffing,
religious content of curriculum, commitment to service to others and to
the poor, relationship to the communities in which the schools are
located, appropriate use of limited resources, and the nature of student
bodies served by the institutions.
20
19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Loyola University Chicago School of Law recently finished a process of three years of
meetings to arrive at a strategic plan for the law school; discussions of Jesuit mission were an
important part of this process and of the plan adopted. Numerous law review articles have
discussed the role of Jesuit schools in legal education. See, e.g., John J. Fitzgerald, Today's
Catholic Law Schools in Theory and Practicq: Are We Preserving Our Identity?, 15 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 245 (2001) (discussing that Catholic law schools have a
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Although there is no uniformity among the schools, Jesuit
universities such as Loyola University Chicago have changed
tremendously in the past half century. Once they were characterized as
institutions with immigrant-heavy student populations, with many
students being the first generation in their family attending a university.
Many of the schools had night programs so that working people could
attain higher education. Most of the students were Catholic; in addition,
the schools often admitted members of other religions and members of
minority groups who faced significant barriers to admission at many
other schools. Jesuit schools usually emphasized professional education
as well as undergraduate study.
21
Today, the student bodies at many Jesuit institutions have changed.
Like other highly competitive and often costly institutions, these
schools have been admitting more affluent students, more students from
families with higher educational attainment, fewer children of recent
immigrants, and fewer students seeking part-time education while
working full-time.
Jesuit schools' commitment to excellence and dedication to mission
should not lead them to become carbon copies of other fine educational
institutions. They should aim to be distinctive in a variety of ways.
One important way to demonstrate their dedication to service for others
and commitment to the poor would be to implement policies to be
among the few excellent universities dedicated to educate a truly
diverse student body including far larger numbers of persons from
disadvantaged racial and economic groups and recent immigrant
backgrounds. Because we believe that diversity inside and outside the
classroom is beneficial to the educational experience and can result in a
better society, we should create admissions policies that bring about
those ends. We should make a conscious decision not to copy the
admissions policies of most prestigious institutions which have
emphasized higher LSAT scores, the enrollment of more affluent
students, maintaining small numbers of minority group students, and
leaving the education of most immigrants and less affluent persons to
other, less prestigious, institutions.
Loyola University Chicago would make itself nationally distinctive
as a well-ranked law school with an enrollment of African-American
fundamental responsibility to train future lawyers to take up Christ's call and to instill a sense of
Christian mission in their students); Daniel J. Morrissey, Bringing the Messiah Through Law:
Legal Education at the Jesuit Schools, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 549 (2004) (discussing that Jesuit
law schools should reach out to all humanity and act as a model for friendship and understanding
among women and men of diverse backgrounds).
21. Morrissey, supra note 20, at 568-69.
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and Hispanic students several times greater in percentage terms than its
competitors. Its academic offerings would in part reflect its concerns to
serve minority communities and the poor. It would in its enrollment,
staff, and student body show its commitment to serve a city whose
population is disproportionately poor and from minority groups. This
would benefit Chicago, benefit Loyola, and benefit our student body.
22
Seeking to achieve these goals would require changed strategies for
attracting applicants, increased grants and loans to students, and
possibly some changes in educational programs. If it resulted in taking
some students with less educational preparation and achievement than
the norm for the school, it would be appropriate to create programs to
assist those students to succeed in law school. These proposals would
be financially costly and might run counter to attempts to increase the
school's ranking based on achievement in standardized testing, but
these changed admission goals would make Jesuit education distinctive
and would contribute towards the attainment of the historical mission of
Jesuit schools and to worthwhile improvements in our society.
22. It is possible that Loyola University Chicago would attract a great many highly talented
students of all backgrounds once its distinctive student body and programming became known.
